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Abstract 
The influence of monetary policy depends on the effectiveness of the interest rate pass-through, that is the size and 
the speed to which changes in the central bank policy actions are transmitted to bank retail interest rates. The 
objective of this paper is to investigate the relationship between the policy-controlled interest rates (Repo and 
Treasury bill rates) and the bank interest rates (interbank, deposit and lending rates) in Rwanda with the view to 
empirically examine the size and speed of the interest rate pass-through in the long run and short run and determine 
whether the pass-through process is symmetric or asymmetric. The empirical results of the paper, using monthly 
data covering the period from January 2008 to December 2017 indicate that the interbank, deposit and policy rates 
are cointegrated, hence a non-linear error correction model has been used to assess the asymmetric adjustment 
dynamics to long-run equilibrium. By contrast, the lending rates were found to be cointegrated with none of the 
selected policy rates; hence the interest rate pass-through has been estimated by means of a transformed 
autoregressive distributed lag model. The empirical results of the study show that the estimated long-run as well 
as the short run interest rate pass-through of the selected policy rates to deposit and lending rates is weak and 
sluggish. Regarding the asymmetric adjustment process of the bank rates, empirical results show that depending 
on the policy rate, the interbank and deposit rates   react differently following a negative and a positive shock in 
the policy rates; but no evidence was provided for asymmetric adjustment of the lending rates. 
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I. Introduction 
The interest rate pass-through has received a great deal of attention in theoretical and empirical research on 
monetary policy making. However, while the bulk of the literature on the issue was devoted to industrial countries, 
it is only recently that a few studies focused on emerging and developing countries. The interest rate pass-through, 
defined as the extent to which changes in the policy rate are transmitted to bank retail interest rates, i.e. the deposit 
and lending rates, is a key element in the monetary transmission mechanism and the effectiveness of monetary 
policy. Central banks use the policy rate to influence the short-term money market rates which in turn affect bank 
retail rates; in the end, banks’ decisions on the yield of their assets and liabilities affect the behavior of deposit 
holders and borrowers on savings, investment and consumption. A fuller and faster interest rate pass-through 
enhances the effectiveness of monetary policy and improves the capacity of the central bank to achieve its 
macroeconomic goals of stabilizing aggregate output and prices. Therefore, the determination of the size and speed 
of the interest pass-through is crucial for the central bank to correctly calibrate its monetary policy stance. 
Various studies have investigated the interest transmission dynamics in different countries. The overall 
findings of these studies indicate that : the pass-through process is incomplete and sluggish, implying that changes 
in the policy rate are not passed on one to one to  bank retail rates and that the transmission takes time ; the size 
and speed of interest rate pass-through varies across countries and over time ; moreover , the interest rate pass-
through varies depending on the bank rates considered and the bank products (Cottarelli ,Ferri and Generale ,1995; 
Mojon ,2000; De Bondt, 2002 ; Sander and Kleimeier , 2004 ). In addition, it was observed that the adjustment of 
the bank retail interest rates may be asymmetric, meaning that the reaction of the bank rates to policy rate shocks 
is different depending on whether the innovation in the policy rate is positive or negative ( De Bondt , 2002 ; 
Sander and Kleimeier ,2006 ; Karagianis ,Panagopoulos and Vlamis , 2010). 
A good understanding of the responsiveness of the bank retail and interbank rates to changes in the policy 
rates is particularly important in Rwanda, given that banks are the predominant financial institutions in collecting 
savings and providing loans to firms and households and are consequently the main conduit of monetary policy 
impulses to the real economy. This paper follows the above line of research and examines in the case of Rwanda 
how effectively the innovations in the policy rates are transmitted to bank retail and interbank rates and whether 
the interest rate pass-through is symmetric or asymmetric , using the most recently available data and appropriate 
methodology.  
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Research problem and motivation 
Most empirical studies on the interest rate pass-through have been concentrated on developed countries and some 
emerging countries of Latin America, Europe and Asia, while the literature on the issue for Sub-Saharan African 
countries remains scanty. Regarding Rwanda, the issue did not attract much attention until recently as the monetary 
authorities envisaged to adopt the inflation targeting regime in a near future for the conduct of monetary policy. 
In Rwanda, as in many other African countries, the monetary policy framework and the financial environment 
have undergone significant reforms in the last two decades resulting in the abolishment of direct credit controls, 
the liberalization of bank interest rates and the removal of barriers to entry of new banks, while the Central Bank 
adopted the indirect and market based instruments for conducting monetary policy. However, despite the changing 
financial environment which was expected to have a significant impact on the interest rate pass-through and by 
implication on the effectiveness of monetary policy, no systematic investigation was carried out to assess the 
effects of the reforms on the interest rate pass-through. This study intends to fill the gap. 
While some studies examined the monetary transmission mechanism in Rwanda (Davoodi, Dixit and Pinter, 
2013; Kigabo, Munyankindi and Amahoro, 2008), only one recent study by Kigabo, Mwenese and Bagabe (2016) 
focused on the interest pass-through in Rwanda using the single equation and the autoregressive distributed lag 
model (ADL) with monthly interest rate series covering the period 2008-2015. The overall finding of this study is 
that the long-run and short run effect of changes in the Treasury bill rate on lending and deposit rates of different 
maturities is incomplete.  
Compared to the paper by Kigabo, Mwenese and Bagabe (2016), the contribution of the present study is 
threefold. Firstly, this study not only examines the interest rate pass-through in Rwanda, but it is  the first attempt 
to investigate the possibility of asymmetries in the dynamic adjustment of the bank retail rates in response to 
changes in the policy rates using cointegration and asymmetric error-correction model approach (Scholnick, 1996; 
Sander and Kleimeier; 2002).Secondly, in addition to the Treasury bill rate used as policy rate in the 
aforementioned paper, the present study examines the pass-through from the repo rate, which provides empirical 
evidence of the relative effectiveness of each instrument in the transmission of policy rate changes to bank retail 
rates. Thirdly, the pass-through from the policy rate to interbank rate has also been investigated since it is the first 
step of the entire pass-through process.  
 
Objective of the study 
The primary objective of this research is to analyze the interest pass-through mechanism in Rwanda; more 
specifically, this study aims to:  
-determine the size and speed of the pass-through between the policy and bank rates 
 in the long run and short run ;  
-examine whether the short-run interest rate adjustment dynamics is symmetric or asymmetric; 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a brief overview of the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the interest rate pass-through; section 3 highlights the main features of financial development and 
monetary policy framework in Rwanda; section 4 presents the data used and the modelling methodology; section 
5 provides and discusses the empirical results of the research; section 6 concludes and summarizes the policy 
implications of the study. 
 
II. Literature review 
Theoretical review 
Theoretically the factors that may affect the bank retail rates responsiveness to changes in the policy rate are 
various; they include but are not limited to the following: structure and ownership of the financial system, collusive 
behavior of banks, menu and switching costs, asymmetric information and macroeconomic conditions. 
The structure of the financial system is a major determinant of the interest rate pass-through and refers to the 
number of market players, the degree of competition and bank concentration, the ownership structure, the level of 
development and openness of financial markets (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994). Cottarelli and Kourelis argued 
that the demand elasticity for loans is weaker in markets where there are a small number of competitors, high 
barriers to entry or no alternative sources of financing; consequently, in such markets, loan rates tend to react 
sluggishly to dynamics in the money market and policy rates in the short run. In contrast, a well-developed 
financial market with domestic bond and money markets, corporate debt securities and capital venture together 
with openness to international capital markets, result in a faster interest rate pass-through (Aziakpono and Wilson, 
2010).  
On the other hand, concentration introduces rigidity in the interest rate pass-through, as banks tend to adopt 
an oligopolistic behavior, causing the interest rates to adjust asymmetrically. Two competing theories have been 
proposed by Hannan and Berger (1991), Neumark and Sharpe (1992) to explain asymmetries in the adjustment of 
the bank retail rates: the collusive pricing behavior of banks and the adverse customer reaction hypothesis.  
The collusive pricing behavior of banks argues that deposit rates will be rigid upwards following an increase 
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in the policy rate because an increase in the deposit rate constitutes an additional cost for banks in the form of a 
higher payment to depositors, while the lending rates will exhibit greater rigidity downwards in reaction to a 
reduction in the policy rate because a reduction in the lending rate negatively affects the profit margin of banks. 
Conversely, the adverse customer reaction behavior suggests that deposit rates will be sticky downwards in the 
event of a decrease in the policy rate, whereas the lending rate will show greater rigidity upwards when the policy 
rate increases. 
The ownership structure of the financial system also plays a central role when it comes to the transmission of 
monetary policy (Espinosa-Vega and Rebucci, 2003; Amarasekara, 2005).In economies where state-owned 
financial institutions (banks and non-banks) are predominant in the financial markets, those institutions are 
instrumental in achieving policy objectives of governments and maximizing profit is not their primary constraint. 
In such an environment, interest rates are likely to adjust with delay due to inefficiencies and political 
considerations, hence causing stickiness in interest rate adjustment. 
According to Rotemberg and Saloner (1987), price rigidity in response to changes in the underlying market 
conditions may be explained by “menu costs” which include the costs of changing and circulating the new price 
lists, printing, advertising, communicating changes to customers. The menu costs theory predicts that firms will 
adjust their prices only when the benefits from adjusting are greater than the cost of being out of equilibrium. 
Moreover, firms need to maintain a long term relationship with their customers and therefore do not want to 
continually alter their prices because this might have a negative impact on customer’s satisfaction. In line with this 
theoretical view, banks may delay before responding to changes in the policy rate (Cottarrelli and Kourelis, 1994). 
When a customer decides to move from a bank or a financial product to another in order to obtain more 
favorable conditions, he is exposed to the so called “switching costs”, referring mainly to search and transaction 
costs, which include the information cost to discover a bank with more favorable rates, the cost of learning different 
rates and conditions on the new loans or deposits. Given these considerations, the higher the switching costs, the 
more difficult it will be for the customer to move from a bank to another; as a result of the customer’s behavior, 
the bank retail interest rate will become sticky (Lowe and Rohling, 1992). 
In their insightful study, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) relate bank retail rates stickiness to asymmetric information 
in loan market. If banks increase their lending rates, they may attract riskier borrowers (adverse selection) while 
the increase of lending rates will give poor quality borrowers incentives to choose riskier projects (moral hazard). 
Consequently, banks will prefer to set lending rates below the market clearing rates and ration the amount of credit 
supply even if the funding costs increase. Thus, the authors have shown that in markets with imperfect information, 
the equilibrium in the loan market is characterized by credit rationing and the prevailing lending rates will not 
necessarily be altered following changes in other interest rates, including the policy rate; in such an environment, 
the lending rates will exhibit rigidity to upward stimulus. 
Macroeconomic conditions have also an important impact on the size of the pass-through and adjustment 
speed of the bank interest rates. Banks find it easier to quicker pass on changes in the policy rate to their lending 
and deposit rates during favorable economic conditions characterized by rapid economic growth and stability 
(Egert and MacDonald, 2009). On the contrary, a higher degree of volatility in the policy and money market rates 
(mirroring high macroeconomic instability and uncertainty), reduces the information content of the policy signals 
and hence, makes it harder for banks to disentangle noise from policy signals; this weakens the interest rate pass-
through, given that banks will wait longer before changing their rates (Egert,Crespo-Cuaresma and Reininger, 
2007). 
 
Empirical review 
Empirical works on the interest rate pass-through are relatively new in economic literature as early studies emerged 
only in the 1990s. In a logit modelling framework Hannan and Berger (1991) investigated the adjustment of prices 
in the US banking market over the period 1983-1986, focusing on deposit rates and the issue of asymmetry. Their 
findings show that price rigidity is significantly greater in market characterized by high level of concentration and 
deposit rates are significantly more rigid when the stimulus for a change is upward rather than downward.  
Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) used an autoregressive distributed lag model and aggregate time series to 
analyze the degree of lending rate stickiness in response to changes in money market rates in 31 selected industrial 
and developing countries. Their empirical results revealed a sluggish and incomplete adjustment in the lending 
rates following a shock in the money market rates and showed that the pass-through is higher in the long-term than 
in the short-term. They further explained that structural features of the financial system, such as capital controls, 
poor bank competition, barriers to entry, degree of development and openness of financial markets are the factors 
that weaken the interest rate pass-through.  
More recent works investigated the bank interest rates stickiness and explored the possibility of asymmetric 
adjustment in developed countries. De Bondt (2005) used a vector error-correction model to measure the pass-
through from the overnight rate to deposit and lending rates in the Euro area in the period 1996-2001. The author 
observed that the short run pass-through for both deposit and lending rates is incomplete, while in the long run, 
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the pass-through to lending rates is complete, but is incomplete for deposit rates. Andries (2012) assessed the 
interest rate pass-through dynamics in the European countries over the period 1993-2002 using the bounds testing 
approach for co-integration. His econometric results revealed that the bank retail rates adjustment following 
monetary impulses is sluggish, implying that banks dampen monetary policy shocks; there is a limited short run 
pass-through for different bank products and important discrepancies across countries have been identified; the 
long run pass-through is higher for interest rates on loans of shorter maturity and greater for interest rates on loans 
compared to interest rates on deposits; there is a marked heterogeneity in the speed of adjustment across European 
countries .  
Karagiannis, Panagopoulos and Vlamis (2010) used a disaggregated general to specific (GETS) model to 
analyze the short-run and long-run interest rate pass-through in the Euro area and the US. Their findings indicate 
mixed results for the size and adjustment speed of the interest pass-through. For the Euro area, evidence suggests 
that changes in the money market rate are more influential than changes in Central Bank rate. There is a complete 
pass-through from money market to deposit rates and incomplete pass-through from money market rate to lending 
rates. For the US, the empirical results suggest that there is a complete and significant pass-through from the 
Central bank rate to both lending and deposit rates. Moreover, the size of the adjustment parameter for upward 
adjustment is quite higher. It appears that there exists no pass-through from money market rate to either bank retail 
rates in the US, implying that the Central bank rate is more effective. For the Euro area, there is a negative 
asymmetry for deposit rates, meaning that banks transmit only negative changes to depositors; in contrast, a 
positive asymmetry was found for loan rates, suggesting that banks tend to pass more of the increases in money 
market to lenders than the decreases.  
A growing number of studies on the bank interest rates stickiness in emerging and developing countries have 
yielded mixed results. The burst of interest for these studies resulted from the move to inflation targeting regimes 
in many emerging and developing in the mid-2000s and the adoption of market-oriented instruments in the conduct 
of monetary policy which enhanced the role of the interest rate (Mohanty and Turner, 2008). These studies intended 
to understand and explain the persistence of interest rate rigidity and higher interest spread, even though financial 
reforms and liberalization were implemented in most emerging and developing countries.  
An early study to be mentioned is that of Scholnick (1996) who found evidence of asymmetries in the interest 
rate adjustment for Malaysia and Singapore. Employing co-integration and non-linear error-correction model, the 
author showed that deposit rates in both countries are more rigid when adjusting upwards than downwards.  
Egert, Crespo-Cuaresma and Reininger (2007) compared the interest rate pass-through in five Central and 
Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia-CEE-5), and three Euro 
area countries (Austria, Germany and Spain) selected as benchmarks. Using a multivariate vector auto-regression, 
this paper investigated the relationship between the policy rate and the bank retail rates on the one hand, the market 
and retail rates on the other hand. The study showed that the pass-through estimates vary from a country to another 
depending on the bank product; the pass-through is generally slow for overnight deposits, but becomes 
significantly higher from short to long term deposit rates; corporate lending rates are much more responsive to 
changes in the policy rate than deposit or household loan rates. In most cases, it was impossible to detect any co-
integration relationship between the variables used.  
Tai, Sek and Har (2012) assessed the pass-through from monetary policy rate to deposit and lending rates in 
Asian countries by running Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) with data covering the period 1988-2010.The 
results of the paper revealed that: the pass-through from the policy rate to deposit and lending rates in short and 
long run is generally small and slow except for Malaysia, Hong Kong and Singapore where it is considerably 
higher and varies over time. In addition, it was also found that even though Korea, Philippines and Thailand 
adopted the inflation targeting regime and used the short term interest rate as the main monetary policy instrument, 
the interest rate adjustment remained sticky. Tai, Sek and Har argue that the faster transmission of the monetary 
policy stance in Malaysia, Hong Kong and Singapore may be explained by the improvement in efficiency of the 
banking system, the availability of alternative sources of financing and the increase of financial openness. 
Cas , Menendez and Frantischek (2011) examined the strength of the pass-through in five Central American 
countries, the CADR-5 (Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) and six Latin 
American countries, the LA-6 (Brazil ,Chile ,Colombia, Mexico , Peru and Uruguay) taken as benchmarks , given 
their relatively more developed monetary policy frameworks. Panel estimation method with data covering the 
period 2004-2010 was employed to measure the pass-through from policy rate to lending rates. The main finding 
of the study was that the pass-through from policy rate to lending rates is generally weaker and slower in the 
CADR-5 countries than in the LA-6 countries. Factors influencing the interest rate adjustment include exchange 
rate flexibility, financial system development, independence and transparency of central banks, dollarization and 
bank concentration.  
Studies that explored interest rate pass-through in Sub-Saharan African countries are limited. Jankee’s (2005) 
work on interest rate pass-through in Mauritius is the earliest attempt. The author used the Johansen co-integration 
approach, TAR and M-TAR models (Enders and Siklos, 2001) to examine how changes in the interbank rate were 
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transmitted to lending and deposit rates during the period 1988-2003.This work concluded that the long run pass-
through was incomplete in Mauritius for deposit as well as for lending rates. Asymmetry was found only for 
lending rates, which exhibited faster adjustment to negative than to positive shocks in the interbank rate. 
Acheampong (2005) found incomplete long-run pass-through of changes in money market rate to lending and 
deposit rates in Ghana using co-integration and error correction model with data covering the period 1994-2004. 
In addition, the findings of the study supported evidence of symmetry in the adjustment of lending and deposit 
rates to changes in the money market rate. Acheampong (2005) argued that low competition, dependence on bank 
loans, interest inelasticity, contract maturity and menu costs could account for the high degree of interest stickiness. 
Sanusi (2010) employed impulse reaction functions from a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) to derive 
the dynamic elasticities of the pass-through of monetary policy and interbank interest rates to lending and deposit 
rates in Nigeria for the period 2002-2010. The empirical results of the study may be summarized as follows: the 
pass-through is incomplete and slow for both deposit and lending rates; the pass-through of the policy rate to 
interbank rate is substantially higher and faster than to deposit and lending rates. The pass-through to money 
market rates increased significantly after the consolidation of the banking sector, while the pass-through to bank 
retail rates decreased relatively to the pre-consolidation period. Sanusi argued that these results are an indication 
that the consolidation of the banking sector and the reforms in the financial system succeeded in improving the 
efficiency in the money market but failed to remove the distortions in the retail loan and deposit rates market. 
Samba and Yan (2010) examined the monetary policy transmission mechanism in the countries of the Central 
African Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC) focusing on the pass-through from the policy rate to long 
term interest rates. They used data spanning the period 1990-2007 in an autoregressive distribution lag framework. 
Several finding emerge from this study: the short run pass-through is higher in the lending rates than in the deposit 
rates. The long-run pass-through from the policy rate to deposit rates is incomplete, while the pass-through to 
lending rates exhibits an overshooting effect in response to change in the policy rate. The study supports the 
evidence of asymmetric adjustment for both deposit and lending rates. For lending rates, the adjustment coefficient 
is lower in the cycle of increasing policy rate, while there is an overshooting reaction in the decreasing cycle. 
Regarding the deposit rates, the adjustment speed is higher in the cycle of increasing policy rate than in the 
decreasing cycle. Samba and Yan argue that the absence of competition in the banking sector, combined with 
excess liquidity in CAEMC countries may help to explain the upward rigidity of deposit rates. At the same time, 
the overshooting reaction of lending rates may reflect the creditors’ overreaction facing higher rates, in order to 
hedge their risks against uncertainty and under developed financial markets. 
In their paper, Sande and Okello (2013) investigate the pass-through dynamics in Uganda, employing 
bivariate co-integration method and the associated error correction model with data covering the period 2005-
2012.They relate the interbank rate to policy rate ( repo rate) on the one hand , and the deposit and lending rates 
to policy rate , on the other hand. Their findings indicate that the long run pass-through coefficient from the policy 
rate to interbank rate is greater than one, implying an overshooting pass-through, while it is incomplete for time 
deposit and lending rates. Likewise, the size of the pass-through of policy rate to saving and demand deposit is 
incomplete. Regarding the short-run adjustment process towards equilibrium, the estimates of the error-correction 
models for the interbank and bank retail rates point to a sluggish adjustment. From these results, Sande and Okello 
conclude that the monetary policy transmission mechanism is effective only for the wholesale interest rates, while 
it is ineffective for retail rates, meaning that the change in the policy rate is not fully transmitted to the retail rates; 
the low speed of adjustment to equilibrium is also an indication of the ineffectiveness of monetary policy to 
influence the banks’ pricing decisions. 
 
III. Financial development and monetary policy in Rwanda 
Structure and development of the financial system  
The analysis of the interest rate pass-through in Rwanda requires a good understanding of how the banking sector 
structure and the financial market developments may influence the behavior of bank interest rates. The banking 
market structure refers to the number and size of banks, while financial development focuses on the existence of 
diversified debt instruments in the financial market  providing alternative financing and saving opportunities. 
Existing literature documented that high concentration in the banking sector could reduce the degree of competition 
among commercial banks and have a negative impact on the interest rate pass-through (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 
1994; Gambacorta, 2008; Di, 2014); by contrast, the development of the financial system strengthens the interest 
rate transmission mechanism as more alternative sources of capital increase the elasticity of demand for bank loans 
(Cottarelli, Ferri and Generale, 1995). 
The financial system in Rwanda has undergone important economic reforms during the two last decades. The 
reforms whose ultimate objective was to set up a sound and competitive financial market included: deregulation 
of interest rates, removal of credit controls, removing bank entry barriers, bank privatization and recapitalization, 
entrenchment of indirect monetary control instruments, development of money and capital markets, strengthening 
bank supervision and regulation and liberalization of foreign exchange markets. These changes which occurred 
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during the 1990s and 2000s were implemented through successive economic adjustment and stabilization 
programs supported by international development partners of Rwanda.  
As a result of the above reforms, the structure of the financial system changed drastically. In the 1980s, the 
financial system in Rwanda consisted of the National Bank of Rwanda (NBR), i.e the Central Bank, three 
commercial banks, one mortgage bank, one development bank, one public insurance company, one public pension 
fund and a network of cooperatives working as a credit union. As at end December 2016, the banking sector is 
comprised of sixteen (16) banks, while the non-bank financial institutions include fifteen (15) insurance 
companies, 472 microfinance institutions and one (1) public pension fund (NBR, August 2017). 
The other component of the financial system is the capital market where long term debt instruments are traded. 
The capital market in Rwanda mainly consisting of Government T-Bonds is at an early stage of development. 
Since the creation of the Capital market in 2011, outstanding Government and corporate bonds worth RWF 227 
billion have been issued representing a mere 3.6% of GDP as at end 2016. It is worth mentioning that in an effort 
to strengthen the financial system, the Government of Rwanda has set up since 2014 a sustained program to issue 
long term T-bonds through the capital market on a quarterly basis. 
Despite the presence of more participants, the banking sector remains overwhelmingly the most predominant 
segment in the financial system in Rwanda. As at December 2016, the banking sector accounts for 66.9% of the 
total assets of the financial system while the share of microfinance institutions and other non-bank financial 
institutions is 6.3% and 26.8 % respectively. The share of the banks in financial intermediation is even stronger, 
as banks account for more than 90% of the loan and deposit markets representing 20.3% and 23.1% of GDP 
respectively (NBR, August 2017).  
The banking sector is not only predominant, but also not competitive. As reported in Kigabo, Munyankindi 
and Amahoro (2008), the low level of competition can be illustrated by the persistent and large interest rate spreads. 
Another sign of weak competition in the Rwandan banks is the high degree of liquidity preference. It has been 
shown in Kigabo, Mwenese and Bagabe (2016) that the banks’ liquidity preference curve in Rwanda becomes 
perfectly elastic at around 16%. Under a perfectly competitive loan market, excess liquidity and bank loans should 
become substitutes at a zero loan rate. The fact that they are substitutes at such a high rate is a clear indication that 
the banking sector is not competitive (Khemraj, 2007).  
Another feature of the Rwandan banking sector is its relative concentration, suggesting that banks have been 
able to exert market power over their clients and behaved in an oligopolistic manner. The National Bank of Rwanda 
noted however that the degree of concentration was significantly reduced in the last ten years as the share of the 
three largest banks in loans, deposits and total assets declined from 62.7%, 70.6% and 66% in 2006 to 44%, 47% 
and 45% respectively in June 2016 (NBR, July 2015-June 2016).  
It has been widely documented that in a situation where firms and households depend on bank loans for their 
activities owing to underdeveloped money and capital markets, banks feel less pressurized to align their lending 
rates to the corresponding market conditions (Acheampong, 2005). In the case of Rwanda, alternative sources of 
debt such as funding from equity and bond markets are almost inexistent because Rwanda’s security and money 
markets lack sufficient products and services suitable for majority of small and medium enterprises as well as for 
individuals. In such a context, bank retail rates may be unresponsive to monetary policy actions from the Central 
Bank due to the inelasticity of demand for loans. The policy implication of the structure of the financial system in 
Rwanda is that banks’ predominance leads to a low and sluggish interest rate pass-through. 
 
Monetary policy framework  
As in most African countries until the end of the 1980s, the financial system in Rwanda functioned according to 
the McKinnon-Shaw financial repression paradigm characterized by government restrictions on the operations of 
financial system such as direct interest rate controls, credit ceilings , high liquid asset and high reserve 
requirements. As argued by Aziakpono and Wilson (2010), these extensive controls left little room for financial 
markets development and led sometimes to financial disintermediation.  
In order to set up a sound and competitive financial system with the view to ensuring an efficient mobilization 
and allocation of financial resources, credit controls were removed in 1992 and interest rates were fully liberalized 
in 1996. 
With the introduction of the money market operations in 1998, the NBR adopted the monetary targeting 
regime framework for the conduct of monetary policy with the use of indirect market based instruments to control 
overall monetary and credit conditions through the demand and supply of liquidity in the banking sector. These 
instruments included: reserve requirement, discount rate, open market operations and interventions in the foreign 
exchange market.  
Regarding the exchange rate policy, it is worth mentioning that policy changes focused on setting up a flexible 
exchange rate regime. In December 1998, Rwanda has accepted the obligations of the IMF’s article VII, sections 
2, 3 and 4 and since then maintained an exchange rate system free of restrictions on payments and transfers for 
international transactions, making the Rwandan currency convertible (Republic of Rwanda of Rwanda , 1998). 
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Currently, as a result of successive revisions of the foreign exchange regulations, operations relating to imports 
and exports, services and capital account including direct and portfolio investments, lending in foreign currencies 
and personal transactions have been fully liberalized (Official Gazette N0.44 of 04/11/2013).  
Flexible exchange rate regime such as the one adopted by the NBR allows the country to enjoy a greater 
autonomy in terms of setting domestic monetary policy (Frankel, 1999) and as argued by Cas, Menendez and 
Frantischek (2011) and Gigigneishvili (2011), the interest rate pass-through is positively associated with exchange 
rate flexibility.  
Even though the NBR relied on the above instruments for the conduct of monetary policy during the period 
covered by this study, it is worth mentioning that the role of the discount rate and the reserve requirement has been 
progressively minimized and market determined instruments have been favored to regulate the amount of liquidity 
in the money market through the open market operations, namely the Treasury bill rate and the Repo rate. Since 
the introduction of the repo operations in 2008, the key repo rate (policy rate) which is announced on a quarterly 
basis has been used to signal the monetary policy stance of the Central bank, while the repo transactions have been 
employed in the open market operations as the main instruments to inject or absorb liquidity in the banking sector. 
These operations involve the repo rate which is the rate at which commercial banks can obtain funds from the 
Central bank, while the reverse repo rate is the rate at which commercial banks can invest their surplus funds in 
Government securities. Therefore by altering the Key repo rate and the Repo rate, the NBR signals its monetary 
policy stance which is transmitted to interbank rates and other money market rates and ultimately to bank retail 
rates.  
To illustrate the developments in the money and capital markets in Rwanda in recent years, the main 
operations comprising short and long term debt instruments are summarized in Table 1 where the volume of 
transactions for each debt instrument is presented. 
Table 1: Developments in domestic financial markets (in millions of RWF) 
Assets 2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016 
Interbank 549,044 518,095 395.0       - 145,800 224,800 242,500 444,953 
Treasury bills - 54,462 64,294 95,256 156,200 172,300 225,100 177,700 
Repurchase 
agreements 
(repos) 
 
58,100 
 
106,800 
 
114,900 
 
52,450 
 
29,500 
 
47,500 
 
26,500 
 
30,500 
Government 
T-bonds 
- 15,000 15,000 10,000 18,500 42,500 55,000 55,000 
Corporate bonds 1,000       -      -      -       - 15,000      -     - 
Source: NBR, Financial Markets Department 
As shown in Table 1, the money and capital markets in Rwanda are dominated by the short term money 
market instruments including interbank transactions, the Repo and T-Bill operations which are short term debt 
instruments used by the Central bank to regulate liquidity in the banking sector, while the long-term debt 
instruments, namely the Government T-bonds and the corporate bonds account for a low share in the global 
financial market. It is worth noting that transactions in repo agreements witnessed an upward trend between 2009 
and 2011 reflecting a tighter monetary policy implemented by the NBR, while a relaxed monetary policy stance 
was observed between 2012 and 2016. In contrast, the volume of T-Bill and T-bonds operations exhibits a different 
pattern as the transactions have been on the rise from 2010 to 2016, reflecting banks’ investments in Government 
securities of longer maturities. In fact, the issuance of Government T-Bonds has been intensified since 2014 in a 
bid to promote and strengthen the capital market development and improve the monetary transmission mechanism 
in Rwanda. It appears however that the capital market is at an early stage of development and cannot compete so 
far with the banking sector in providing funding and saving opportunities to the public. 
 
3.3. Interest rate developments  
Before engaging in a rigorous analysis based upon econometric technique, it is instructive to look at the behavior 
of the key variables during the sample period, namely the bank and the policy rates. To this effect, the 
developments of the short term lending rates (LRSHT), the three months maturity deposit rate (DR-3m), the 
interbank rate (INTBAN), the Repo rate and the three months maturity Treasury bill rate (Tbr-3m) are depicted in 
Figure 1,while the developments of the long term lending rate (LRLOT) , the interbank rate , the six months 
maturity deposit rate (DR-6m), the Repo rate  and the six months maturity Treasury bill rate (Tbr-6m) are displayed 
in Figure 2 .A common feature to be pointed out in the two figures is that, there is a consistently large spread 
between the lending and deposit rates, suggesting that during the sample period, there have been no efficiency 
gains in the banking system in Rwanda pointing to persistence of a non-competitive market . 
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Figure 1: LRSHT, DR-3m, Repo rate, Tbr-3m and INTBAN 
 
It is worth noting that during almost the whole period covered by this study, the banking sector was 
characterized by excess liquidity, resulting notably from the expansion of public spending reflecting the scaling 
up of foreign aid to Rwanda, so that the different monetary policy instruments were used by the Central Bank to 
drain this excess liquidity by reducing banks’ reserves.  
It may be observed in Figures 1 and 2 that except for the year 2009 marked by the credit crunch and 2010 
characterized by comfortable liquidity conditions in the banking sector, the lending rates (short and long-term) 
were fairly stable and varied within a narrow range, while the deposit rates, the Treasury bill and the repo rates 
were more volatile and displayed stronger fluctuations. This contrasting behavior of the lending and other rates 
whereby lending rates seem to follow an independent development path, may be explained by the fact that the 
lending rates are unresponsive to changes in the policy rates because they are determined by factors other than the 
cost of funds, while the deposit rates are sensitive to changes in the policy rates and exhibit similar developments. 
As stated by the NBR in a recent policy document, the weak responsiveness of the lending rates to changes in the 
key repo rate is due to, among other factors, high operating costs in the banking system and high provisions for 
bad loans. In addition, the behavior of borrowers such as lack of information on loan conditions and culture of not 
bargaining with banks contributed to the rigidities in lending rates charged by banks (NBR, February 2015).  
Despite their higher volatility, the deposit, interbank and policy rates exhibit a regular co-movement 
suggesting a long-run relationship between these rates; this co-movement is discernible in Figures 1 and 2. During 
the sample period, monetary policy has been actively used to cope with a variety of challenges stemming from 
domestic and external shocks. For instance, the shocks caused by global food and fuel crisis in 2008 resulted in 
higher inflation rising to more than 20% by end 2008. The NBR responded to these developments with a tighter 
monetary policy by raising the policy rate in mid-2008. However, by end 2008 and early 2009, following the world 
economic slowdown and a domestic liquidity crisis, the Rwandan economy experienced a sharp decrease in the 
growth of bank loans to private sector from 32% in 2008 to 4% in 2009. As a result the Central Bank relaxed the 
monetary policy stance to curb the decline in broad money and credit to private sector. The ensuing accommodative 
monetary policy meant to improve banks’ liquidity and stimulate credit to economy included the cut of the key 
repo rate from 9% in December 2009 to 7 % in early 2010. In subsequent years, the Central Bank implemented a 
prudent monetary policy to prevent risks of exacerbating inflation pressures resulting from rising inflation and 
uncertainties in the international and regional environment during the period 2011-2013.  
Accommodative monetary policy was again implemented from the second half of 2013 through 2014 to 
support the recovery of the economy from the slowdown registered in 2013. The monetary policy stance was 
further relaxed in 2015 as the Central bank reduced the key repo rate to 6.5% in a context of low inflation. This 
downward trend of the policy rate was reversed in 2016 where money market rates have been increasing reflecting 
tighter liquidity conditions in the banking system in a context of economic slowdown. This change may also be 
explained by the interventions of the Central Bank in the foreign exchange market by selling US dollars to banks 
and the will of the monetary authorities to align the money market rates to the key repo rate so as to develop 
interbank market transactions (NBR, February 2017).  
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Figure 2: LRLOT, Dr-6m, Repo rate, Tbr-6m and INTBAN 
 
A close examination of the developments of the deposit and interbank rates in Figures 1 and 2 shows that the 
fluctuations of both rates follow closely the changes in the policy rates, i.e. the repo and Treasury bill rates, albeit 
with a lag. 
The responsiveness of the deposit and interbank rates to changes in the policy rate in the context of a global 
declining trend of the policy rates and relatively stable lending rates is consistent with the profit maximizing 
behavior of banks as the decline in the deposit rates increases the interest rate spread which contributes to the 
improvement of the banks’ profit margin.  
The foregoing analysis is an attempt to uncover the nature of the relationship between the bank rates and the 
policy rates in Rwanda. Overall, the visual inspection of the developments of the different rates shows clearly that, 
lending rates are not sensitive to changes in the Repo and Treasury bill rates. Conversely, the deposit and interbank 
rates exhibit a closer relationship with the selected policy rates, suggesting that monetary policy actions have more 
influence on deposit and interbank rates than on lending rates. However, this preliminary assessment cannot 
provide convincing information on the real nature of the relationship between the bank rates and the policy rates; 
this task has been achieved through a rigorous econometric analysis. 
 
IV. Data and methodology 
4.1. Data 
The data used in this research consist of average monthly series of two policy rates, namely the Treasury bill rate 
of different maturities (from one to six months) and the Repo rate along with three bank rates (interbank, deposit 
and lending rates) collected from tables published by the National Bank of Rwanda. Interbank rate, deposit rates 
of different maturities (from one to six months) and lending rates of short, medium and long term have been 
considered for analysis. The data cover the sample period 2008-1 to 2016-12. This period has been chosen for two 
main reasons. First, the repo rate was introduced in 2008 as a new monetary policy instrument. Second, during this 
period, the main reforms in the financial system had been completed and the Central Bank had gained its full 
independence and relied more on the interest rate for conducting monetary policy. The choice of policy variables 
can be motivated as follows. In the current monetary policy framework, the key repo rate is the instrument used to 
signal the monetary policy stance of the Central bank. However, the key repo rate is announced on a quarterly 
basis and may remain unchanged for long time periods, which makes it less suitable for econometric purposes. By 
contrast, the Repo rate is dynamic since it is used by the NBR in the open market operations as the main instrument 
to signal the financial conditions in the money markets on a daily basis; therefore, the Repo rate is considered as 
the main policy rate in this study. The Treasury bill rate of different maturities has also been used as policy rate 
since it has been argued in the literature that in the long-run, banks set their retail prices in line with their marginal 
cost, i.e. the funding cost on loans and opportunity cost of deposits, which can be best estimated by money market 
rates reflecting market conditions (De Bondt, 2005).  
 
4.2. Methodology 
i). Theoretical framework 
The theoretical analysis of the interest rate pass-through starts with a good understanding of the banks’ price setting 
behavior in the determination of their lending and deposit rates in the presence of monetary policy shocks. The 
price charged by banks is indeed crucial since it influences their profitability and the soundness of the banking 
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industry, which in turn enhances financial stability. The oligopolistic version of the Monti-Klein model of bank 
profit maximization theory implying imperfect competition, asymmetric information and switching costs in the 
financial markets as outlined in Freixas and Rochet ( 2008) has been extensively used to explain the link between 
the policy rate and the bank retail rates (Fuertes, Heffernan and Kalotchou ,2006 ; Misati ,Nyamongo and Kamau 
, 2011; Banerjee,  Bystrov and Mizen ,2012 ; Makambi, Wawire and Omolo, 2013 ; Mbowe, 2015). The present 
study relies on the same approach as the Rwandan banks may be considered as oligopolistic and therefore exert 
market power in interest rate setting. As presented in Makambi, Wawire and Omolo (2013), under the modified 
Monti-Klein model, a bank is not a price-taker but sets its loan rates taking into account the demand for loans and 
deposits; the bank is further assumed to have direct clearing relationships with the Central Bank and seek to 
maximize profit (π), subject to its balance sheet. The balance sheet of the bank is comprised of loans (L) and 
reserves (R) on the assets side and deposits (D) and settlement balance (S) with the Central Bank on the liabilities 
side,  so that : 
R+L=D+S…………………………………………………………………………………                             (1) 
It also follows that from equation (1) that total deposits may be presented as: 
D=R+L-S……………………………………………………………………………                                     (2) 
Assuming that a commercial bank extends loans at a rate iL and pays interest rate iD on deposits, it follows that the 
net interest income (NII) of the bank is given by the difference between the total interest earned on loans and the 
total interest expense paid to deposit holders : 
NII = iLL- iD (R+L-S)………………………………………………………………                                       (3) 
Clearing operations with other banks are conducted via the Central bank and commercial banks whose balance is 
negative pay a liquidity penalty equivalent to a punitive interest rate, iP, known as the policy rate multiplied by the 
difference between the settlement balance and the required reserves at the Central bank, which gives the following 
total penalty equal to: 
iPδ(S-R) …………………………………………………………                                                               (4)  
The commercial bank also incurs costs of managing loans. Taking this cost function as given by μL and using the 
modified Monti-Klein model which assumes that banks are confronted with a downward sloping demand function 
for loans and an upward sloping function for deposits, the profit maximization function, π (L, R), derived from the 
combination of equations (3) and (4), may be expressed as the sum of the intermediation margins on loans and 
deposits minus the liquidity penalty and the management costs of loans as follows: 
π (L,R) =  iLL - iD (R+L-S) - δiP (S-R) - μL……………………………………………                               (5) 
The bank’s decision variables in the model are the volume of loans granted and the quantity of precautionary 
reserves it chooses to hold and profit maximizing bank equates its marginal revenue to marginal cost. Therefore, 
computing the first order conditions from the above profit maximization function by differentiating equation (5) 
with respect to L and R, and setting the results equal to zero yields: 
iL - iD - μ = 0……………………………………………………………………………                                 (6) 
and  
- iD + δiP = 0…………………………………………………………………………                                     (7) 
From equation (6) and (7), it follows that iL - iD = μ and   iD = δiP, implying that  
iL = δiP + μ ………………………………………………………… ………………                                     (8)  
Thus, the oligopolistic version of the Monti-Klein model demonstrates that there is a linear relationship between 
the policy rate and the bank retail rates and shows how changes in the policy rate may be transmitted to bank retail 
rates. Equation (8) formed the basis of the interest rate pass-through analysis in the empirical literature. 
Nonetheless, the above model may be criticized on the ground that, first, banks are not bound to borrow from the 
Central bank and pay a penalty rate and, second, developments of bank retail rates do not necessarily reflect the 
behavior of the policy rate. The policy rate is indeed a very short-term rate, while lending and deposit rates are 
expected to reflect long-term rates; furthermore, banks may obtain funds from a variety of sources, including retail 
deposits, interbank, bonds and Treasury bill markets (Illes, Lombardi and Mizen, 2015). Hence, using the policy 
rate to measure the interest rate pass-through would lead to erroneous conclusion on the interest rate pass-through 
process. De Bondt, Mojon and Valla (2005), De Bondt (2002) argue that in the long-run, banks set their retail 
prices in line with their marginal costs, i.e. the funding cost on loans and the opportunity cost of deposits, which 
can be best estimated by money market rates reflecting market conditions. 
ii). Empirical model and estimation procedure 
In order to analyze the relationship between the policy rates and the bank rates and measure the size and speed of 
the interest rate pass-through in Rwanda, autoregressive distributed lag model (ADL), co-integration technique, 
non-linear error correction models have been be used. Using non-linear error correction model allows testing for 
differences in the bank rates adjustment when they are below or above their equilibrium level following a positive 
or negative shock in the policy rates.  
To conduct the above analysis, the following basic model for interest rate pass-through proposed by De Bondt 
(2005) has been used:  
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brt = b0 + b1prt + εt                                                                                                                                 (9) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
where brt is the endogenously determined bank rate; prt denotes the policy rate assumed to be exogenous; εt is the 
i.i.d stochastic error term of the model; b0 and b1 are the long run model parameters; b0 represents the constant 
markup and b1 measures the degree of pass-through in the long run. Equation (9) provides a primary model of 
bank pricing decisions from which to assess the sensitivity of the bank rates to changes in the policy rates and in 
so doing the strength and magnitude of the interest rate pass-through. If markets are perfect (i.e. full information 
and perfect competition), the coefficient b1 is expected to be equal to one, implying a complete long run pass-
through or full transmission of monetary impulses to bank rates; in the context of imperfect markets, coefficient 
b1 will be less than one, suggesting an incomplete interest rate pass-through or partial transmission of policy rate 
changes to bank rates. In fact , it is unlikely that the value of b1 will be equal to one not only due to imperfect 
markets , but also to a number of factors including fixed menu costs, asymmetric information, high switching costs 
, collusive behavior and adverse customer reaction (Egert and Macdonald ,2009 ; Aziakpono and Wilson, 2010). 
It has also been pointed out that b1 could be higher than one, hence recording an overshooting pass-through; this 
may occur when banks charge higher interest rates in an attempt to offset higher risks resulting from asymmetric 
information rather than reducing the supply of loans de Bondt (2005). 
The econometric technique to be used for estimating equation (9) depends on the time series properties of the 
data. Therefore, a natural starting point of the analysis is to test all the variables for unit roots and determine their 
order of integration.  
If the time series of bank and policy rates were found to be stationary in level, Equation (9) was estimated by 
ordinary least squares (OLS) technique. If the data were integrated in level, but stationary in first difference, the 
series were tested for cointegration. If the first difference stationary series were not cointegrated, then equation (9) 
was estimated by the conventional autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) model:  
      ∆brt = b0 + b1Δprt +

n
i 1
bi ∆prt-i  +

m
i 1
ci ∆brt-i  + μt                                                               (10) 
where ∆ denotes the first difference operator, b1 is the measure of the immediate pass-through while bi 
represents the short run pass-through reflected in the different lags of the policy rate, ci is the autoregressive 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable , μt is the white noise error term, n and m are the optimal number of 
lags used in the model. From equation (10), the long-run pass-through coefficients b1 in equation (9) can be 
computed as in Egert, Crespo-Cuaresma and Reininger (2007) and Kwapil and Scharler (2010): 
       b1 =

n
i 1
bi   / (1-

m
i 1
ci )                                                                                                      (11)                                                                                                            
Keele and De Boef (2004) have also demonstrated that subject to some technical transformation, the conventional 
ADL may be used to generate an error-correction model with non-cointegrated stationary time series. Thus, Keele 
and De Boef propose to estimate the following regression: 
∆rt = α0 + ρrt-1 + μ1∆prt + μ2prt-1 + εt                                                                                                   (12)                                                                            
which can further be reparametrized in an error-correction model : 
∆rt = α0 + ρ (rt-1-μ2prt-1) + μ1∆1prt + εt                                                                                                 (13)    
in which ρ is interpreted as the speed of adjustment towards equilibrium and μ1 captures the contemporaneous or 
immediate pass-through. The long-run parameters can be estimated from equation (12) as θ0 = α0/ ρ and θ2 = μ2/ ρ. 
In case the time series of interest rates were found to share a long-run relationship (i.e., cointegrated), this 
study adopted a dynamic model referred to as the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds testing approach 
to cointegration proposed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) for cointegration analysis:  
∆brt = α0+α1Δprt+γbrt-1+δprt-1+

n
i 1
αi∆prt-i + 

m
i 1
ci∆brt-i + μt                              (14)  
where α1 represents the immediate pass-through, γ and δ are the coefficients of the lagged level variables; ci is the 
autoregressive parameter, αi  represents the short run pass-through ; μt is an i.i.d process with zero mean and 
constant variance. 
The bounds testing approach presents important advantages over the other existing techniques in modelling 
cointegration dynamics as it provides greater flexibility in relaxing the assumptions that the time series should be 
integrated of the same order , they can indeed be I(0) or I(1). The small sample properties of the bounds testing 
approach are superior to that of other cointegration testing approaches. Furthermore , as argued by Fuertes and 
Heffernan (2008) and Ahmad , Aziz and Rummun (2013), equation (14) can be estimated by OLS and yields 
unbiased and consistent measures of long run mark-up b0 and pass-through b1 of equation (9).  
Following the bounds testing approach, the presence of cointegration is detected by the implementation of 
the Wald coefficient restriction test (F-statistic) to the lagged level variables (brt-1 and prt-1) in equation (14) and 
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the null hypothesis of no cointegration is H0 : γ = δ = 0 against the alternative H1: γ ≠ δ ≠ 0. The computed F-test 
value is compared with the critical values tabulated in Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001). For a given level of 
significance, if the computed F-test statistic is smaller than the lower bound value, then the null hypothesis is not 
rejected; conversely if the computed F-test statistic is greater than the upper bound value, then the null hypothesis 
is rejected. On the other hand, if the computed F-statistic falls between the lower and upper values, then the result 
of the test is not conclusive. A significant F-test statistic for testing the joint significance of the lagged level 
variables indicates the existence of a long-run relationship and on the basis of equation (14) the long-run 
parameters of equation (9) are calculated as b0 = - α0/γ and b1 = -δ/γ . 
To investigate the interest rate pass-through, the error correction mechanism (ECM) has been generally used 
in the literature. This methodology has the ability to quantify both the degree and speed of adjustment of the bank 
retail rates following a change in the policy rate. It also allows a distinction between the long-run relationship of 
the two variables and the short run adjustment towards their long-run equilibrium. On the basis of equation (14) 
this study derives an error correction model similar to that used by Sander and Kleimeir (2004) and Aziakpono 
and Wilson (2010) to examine the short run and long-run dynamics of the bank retail rates in response to changes 
in the policy rate:  
       ∆brt = β0 + β1∆prt  + 

n
i 1
 βi ∆prt-i + 

m
i 1
λi ∆brt-I + φECTt-1 + ηt                                                 (15) 
where ∆ denotes the first difference operator, β1 is the measure of the immediate pass-through while βi 
represents the short run pass-through reflected in the different lags of the policy rate, λi is the autoregressive 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable , ηt   is the white noise error term, n and m are the optimal number of 
lags used in the model. ECTt-1 (=brt -1 - β0 - β1prt-1) represents the error correction term lagged by one period 
obtained from the long-run relationship given by equation (15) and captures the extent of the disequilibrium at 
time (t-1); φ is the coefficient of the error correction term capturing the speed of adjustment of bank rates towards 
their long run equilibrium level and measures the portion of the disequilibrium that is corrected in the next period; 
if the coefficient φ is statistically significant and negative , it means that market forces are in operation to restore 
long run equilibrium after short run disturbances . 
Equation (15) corresponds to the conventional linear error-correction model and implicitly assumes that the 
adjustment speed of the bank rates following a deviation from the long-run equilibrium represented by φ, is 
symmetric, meaning that it is the same following a positive or negative shock.  
However, the short run dynamics may be asymmetric, meaning that the speed of adjustment is different 
depending on the strength and the direction of the policy shock. Fuertes, Heffernan and Kalotchou (2006), argue 
that due to structural shocks, exogenous and endogenous factors, the speed of adjustment may be asymmetric with 
respect to the magnitude and direction of monetary policy action. Therefore, it is important to relax the symmetric 
assumption in order to assess the true nature of the adjustment dynamics. To account for the potential asymmetry 
in the adjustment process, this study follows Scholnick (1996), Sander and Kleimeier (2002).The procedure 
consists of splitting the residuals obtained from the long-run relationship into two series of positive and negative 
residuals defined as follows:  
ECT+ = ECT if ECT ˃0                                                                                                                       (16)                                                                                                                         
ECT = 0 if ECT ˂ 0  
and   
ECT-= ECT if ECT˂0                                                                                                                          (17)                                                                                      
ECT = 0 if ECT ˃0                                                                                                                                                                                                  
The asymmetric residuals specified in (16) and (17) are then introduced as separate variables in the error-correction 
model to obtain the asymmetric short run dynamic model: 
     ∆brt = δ0 + b1∆prt  + 

n
i 1
bi∆prt-i +

m
i 1
ci∆brt-i  + φ1ECT+t-1 + φ2ECT-t-1 + μt                                             (18 ) 
where φ1 and φ2 are respectively the coefficients of the positive and negative error-correction terms.  
The positive error correction term (ECT+t-1) in equation (18) implies that if the bank rate is above its long-run 
equilibrium value following a decline in the policy rate, it will start falling in the next period; similarly, the negative 
error correction term (ECT-t-1) suggests that if the bank rate is below its equilibrium level following an increase in 
the policy rate, it will start rising in the subsequent period. The coefficients of the error-correction terms, φ1 and 
φ2, provide the information on the speed of adjustment of the bank rates during expansionary and contractionary 
monetary policy.  
The presence of asymmetry is tested using the Wald test on the restriction that φ1 = φ2 in equation (18). If 
equality of the two coefficients is not rejected, this implies no asymmetry in the adjustment process, while rejection 
of equality points to existence of asymmetry. On the other hand, if φ1 ˃ φ2, this suggests that banks are quicker to 
adjust their rates downwards than they are to adjust them upwards, while if φ2 ˃ φ1, means that banks would adjust 
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their rates upwards faster than they are to adjust them downwards.  
 
V. Empirical results and discussion 
Time series properties of the data 
The Augmented Dickey Fuller (1981) and the Phillips-Perron (1988) unit root tests have been employed to 
determine whether the bank rates (lending , deposit and interbank rates) and the policy rates (Repo  and Treasury 
bill rates) are stationary or not. The tests have been performed with level and first difference series with only 
deterministic assumption of constant as the time series on interest rates do not exhibit any trend.  
Table 2:  Unit root tests with constant: 2008:1- 2016:12 
Variables ADF PP 
              Level First difference             Level     First difference 
    Short-term lending rate - 4.293981        - 17.22636         - 6.852495         - 37.87146 
    Medium-term lending rate - 3.487204        - 14.65414         - 3.167672         - 15.98055 
    Long-term lending rate - 3.681175        - 11.05033         - 6.580244         - 81.59973 
    Deposit rate-1 month - 5.782765        - 10.66773         - 5.778322         - 42.22669 
    Deposit rate-3 months - 2.348815        - 11.79147         - 3.938492         - 15.30330 
    Deposit rate-6 months - 3.633511        - 13.18539         - 3.429478         - 14.58730 
    T-bill rate -1 month - 1.693834        - 15.07884         - 2.400946         - 14.89926 
    T-Bill rate-3 months - 1.828337        - 11.42297         - 1.994364         - 11.36604 
    T-bill rate-6 months - 2.191023        - 13.59482         - 2.709599         - 13.61173 
Interbank rate - 1.635134        -10.86784         - 1.850376         - 10.86802 
    Repo rate - 1.850841        - 9.351902         - 1.900449         - 9.359472 
C    
Critical value  at   1% significance  
level 
 
- 3.493129 
 
       -3.493129 
 
- 3.492523 
 
  - 3.493129 
From the results of both tests in Table 2, it appears that the series of lending rates and one month deposit rate 
are stationary in level at 1% significance level , while the policy rates , the interbank , the three and six months 
deposit rates are found to be non-stationary , i.e I (1). However, all the variables are stationary in first difference. 
 
Testing for co-integration relationship 
Once the time series properties of the variables have been identified, the next step of the empirical analysis is to 
test for the co-integration relationship between the bank rates and the policy rates considered in this study. It is a 
common phenomenon that many economic time series data are non-stationary but move together over time; in 
particular, it has been documented in the literature that the bank rates cannot drift too far from the policy rate over 
a long period, suggesting that the series are bound by a long-run equilibrium relationship (Fuertes and Heffernan, 
2008).  
Table 3 presents the results of the ARDL bounds test for cointegration.To test for the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration as well as for the significance of the long-run coefficients in equation (14), the Wald-test (F-test) 
proposed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) has been used. Following the procedure explained earlier, equation 
(14) has been estimated by OLS and the computed F-statistic was compared with tabulated critical values in 
Pesaran,Shin and Smith (2001). As shown in Table 3, the computed F-statistic test for every pairwise relationship 
between the selected variables is greater than the upper bound critical value at the 5% significance level, implying 
rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration .The computed F-test statistic varies indeed between 6.25 and 
9.58, while the upper bound critical values of the tabulated F-test range between 4.94 and 5.73. 
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Table 3: ARDL Bounds test for cointegration of deposit, interbank and policy rates 
Relationship Computed  F-statistic    10% critical  
        bounds 
 5% critical  
   bounds 
Deposit rate - 1 month 
         T-Bill rate-1month 
         Repo rate 
 
7.39 
9.58 
 
4.04-4.78 
4.04-4.78 
 
4.94-5.73 
4.94-5.73 
Deposit rate-3 months 
         T-bill rate-3 months 
         Repo rate 
 
7.11 
7.15 
 
4.04-4.78 
4.04-4.78 
 
4.94-5.73 
4.94-5.73 
Deposit rate- 6 months 
         T-Bill rate-6months 
 
6.25 
 
4.04 
 
4.94-5.73 
Interbank rate 
         T-bill rate-3 months 
         Repo rate 
 
9.29 
9.18 
 
4.04-4.78 
4.04-4.78 
 
4.94-5.73 
4.94-5.73 
Note: The bounds test critical values are obtained from Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001), p.300; Table CI (iii), 
Case III: unrestricted intercept and trend. 
Thus, it emerges from the test that there exists a long-run relationship between the deposit and Treasury bill 
rates of same maturities on the one hand and between the deposit and the Repo rates, on the other hand; the 
interbank rate is also cointegrated with the Treasury bill and the Repo rates. 
Given the presence of a cointegration relationship between these variables, asymmetric error correction 
models have been examined. By contrast, the lending rates have been found to be cointegrated with none of the 
policy rates. 
 
Regression results and discussion 
Before proceeding to the discussion of empirical results, it is worth noting that in all regression results related to 
cointegration as well as to error correctional models, robustness of the estimated models has been assessed and 
was confirmed by the conventional diagnostic tests, i.e., the Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test, 
heteroschedasticity test (ARCH test), Jarque-Bera normality and Ramsey Reset specification tests. However some 
of the models failed to fulfill the normality test, but given the large number of observations (108) involved, this 
does not invalidate the robustness of the models as argued in Dube and Zhou (2014).The goodness of fit of the 
models as measured by the adjusted R2 ranged between 0.279 and 0.439 ; given that the dependent variable is at 
first difference, this adjusted R2 is satisfactory (Green ,2003).To determine the lag structure of different models 
this study relied on the Hendry (1987) general to specific approach by starting with twelve lags and then removing 
non-significant lags; this implies that for each set of dependent and independent variables, the most parsimonious 
model has been selected for interpretation. 
i). Deposit and interbank rates 
Long-run relationship 
The results in Table 4 present the ARDL bounds testing estimates of the long-run coefficients of the pairwise 
relationship between interbank, deposit, and policy rates for which a co-integration relationship has been 
identified. Depending on the maturity, the estimated long-run pass-through between the deposit and the Treasury 
bill rates ranges between 0.19 and 0.53, while the pass-through between the deposit rates and Repo rate varies 
between 0.28 and 0.62.The long-run pass-through from the Repo rate and the three months maturity Treasury bill 
rate to the interbank rate is respectively 1.24 and 0.86. The six months maturity deposit rate is only cointegrated 
with the Treasury bill rate of same maturity and exhibits a long-run coefficient of 0.51. 
Table 4: ARDL Bounds test results of estimated long-run coefficients 
Relationship T-Bill rate-3 months T-Bill rate -6  months    Repo  rate 
Deposit rate-1 month         0.19                - 0.28 
Deposit rate-3 months          0.53 - 0.62 
Deposit rate-6 months          -             0.51  
Interbank rate                     0.86              1.24 
According to the above empirical results, only between 19% and 62% of the changes in the policy rates are 
transmitted to the deposit rates, pointing to an incomplete interest rate pass-through and weakness of the interest 
rate channel in Rwanda. However, these results show also that the interbank rate is highly sensitive to changes in 
policy rates, as it exhibits a pass-through of 0.86 with the T-bill rate and even an overshooting pass-through of 
1.24 with the Repo rate, meaning that the pass-through from the T-Bill and the Repo rates to interbank is 86% and 
124% respectively. The overshooting pass-through of the Repo rate to interbank rate was also found by Sande and 
Okello (2013) for the case of Uganda, suggesting that monetary policy is more effective in whole sale rate than in 
retail rates. On the other hand, a strong long-run interest rate pass-through is observed when the three months 
Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development                                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1700 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2855 (Online) DOI: 10.7176/JESD 
Vol.10, No.14, 2019 
 
140 
deposit rate is associated with the T-bill rate of same maturity and the Repo rate, implying that this category of 
deposit rate is the most responsive to changes in the policy rates. In a policy perspective, this suggests that in the 
current NBR monetary policy framework, the Repo rate and the T-bill rates may be considered as the most 
appropriate monetary policy instruments, but the Repo rate appears to be more effective, since it exerts a stronger 
impact on deposit and interbank rates. This also indicates that the decision of the Central Bank of Rwanda made 
since 2008 to use the Repo operations as the main instrument in the open market operations was relevant as it 
reinforced the monetary transmission mechanism. It is worth noting that knowing the class of assets affected by 
the monetary policy stance in the banks’ portfolio and the specific policy instrument that affects them is crucial 
for the Central bank.  
The significantly higher pass-through of the Repo and Treasury bill rates to the interbank rate is an important 
information for monetary authorities, since the pass-through of the policy rate to interbank rate is the first step of 
the entire pass-through process from the policy rate to bank retail rates. Furthermore, depending on the policy rate 
considered, only a small portion of the changes in the policy rates is transmitted to deposit rates, implying that in 
Rwanda the interest rate pass-through is incomplete in the deposit market and supports the findings of the earlier 
study for Rwanda by Kigabo, Mwenese and Bagabe (2016) in which the long-run pass-through from the Treasury 
bill rate to deposit rates ranged between 0.14 and 0.45.  
Short-run asymmetric adjustment  
The short run dynamics between the pairs of interest rates has been investigated using non-linear error-correction 
model as defined in equation (18) for asymmetric adjustment. An asymmetric error-correction term corresponding 
to each of the long-run relationships presented in Table 5 has been estimated to unveil the possible asymmetric 
adjustment of short-run interest rate pass-through and the speed of adjustment of the deposit and interbank rates 
to long-run equilibrium.  
Table 5: Results of asymmetric dynamic adjustment    
 
     Deposit rate / Policy 
rate 
 
ᵠ1 ECT (-1)+ 
 
      ᵠ2 ECT (-1)- 
 
          Wald test 
Null hypothesis 
Ho : φ1= φ2 
     Deposit rate - 1 month/ 
            T-Bill rate-1month  
 -0.8014 
 (-5.65) 
  -0.2854 
   (-1.41) 
 3.2335 [0.0721] 
    Deposit rate-3 months/ 
            T-bill rate-3 
months 
  
-0.5220 
  (-2.96) 
   
-0.1509 
   (-0.781) 
 
        1.3844 [0.2304] 
     Deposit rate -6 months / 
            T-Bill rate 6 months 
  -0.2534 
    (-1.81) 
   -0.5925 
    (-3.37) 
 1.5676 [0.2106] 
     Deposit rate 1month/ 
            Repo rate 
  -0.8140 
  (-5.19) 
   -0.2641 
    (-1.81) 
 4.8427 [0.0278] 
Deposit rate-3months / 
           Repo rate 
  -0.9666 
  (-2.91) 
   -0.2462 
     (-2.45) 
3.6194 [0.0571] 
Interbank rate/Repo rate 
 
 -0.144 
   (-1.95) 
  -0.176 
    (-1.73) 
 0.0465 [ 0.829] 
Note: In parenthesis are indicated the values of the t-statistic and between brackets is the probability level showing 
the significance level to reject or not the null hypothesis.  
The objective of the analysis is to empirically ascertain whether the speed of adjustment of bank rates is 
different following a positive or negative shock in the policy rates. To measure the potential asymmetric adjustment 
of the deposit and interbank rates to changes in the policy rates, equation (18) has been used and the null hypothesis 
has been tested using the Wald test statistic. The null hypothesis posits that the speed of adjustment is the same 
following a rise or a cut in the policy rate, implying that the coefficients of the error-correction terms in equation 
(18) are equal , that is H0 : φ1 = φ2. .The results of the error correction terms and Wald test statistics are reported 
in Table 5. 
In Table 5, φ1 represents the speed of adjustment coefficient associated with a positive deviation when the 
deposit rate is above its long-run equilibrium value, implying a decrease in the policy rate associated with an 
expansionary monetary policy and φ2 represents the speed of adjustment coefficient associated with a negative 
deviation when the deposit rate is below its long-run equilibrium value, reflecting the implementation of a tight 
monetary policy through an increase of the policy rate.  
The results of the empirical estimates support the evidence of regime switching adjustment of the bank retail 
rates and point to asymmetric adjustment of the deposit rates to changes in the policy rates in three cases. As shown 
in Table 5 by the results of the Wald-test statistic, the null hypothesis, H0:φ1 = φ2, has been rejected at 10% 
significance level when the deposit rate and the Treasury bill rate of one month of maturity are associated on the 
one hand, and when the deposit rate of three months of maturity is linked to Repo rate, on the other hand. Likewise, 
the null hypothesis has also been rejected at 5% significance level when the deposit rate of one month of maturity 
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is associated with the Repo rate. Moreover, the adjustment coefficient, φ1, is significant in all cases and its 
magnitude is quite high and varies between -0.8014 and -0.9666, while the adjustment coefficient φ2 is only 
significant when the deposit rates of one and three months of maturity are associated with the repo rate and its 
values are -0.2641 and -0.2462 respectively.  
Hence in these three cases, the presence of asymmetric adjustment has been demonstrated suggesting that in 
the other remaining three cases, including three months, six months maturity deposit rates and the interbank rate , 
the null hypothesis has not been rejected , implying that the adjustment process to long-run equilibrium is 
symmetric. Furthermore, it is worth noting that in the cases where asymmetric adjustment has been detected, the 
coefficient, φ1,is significantly higher than the coefficient φ2, suggesting that the adjustment dynamic to equilibrium 
is faster in case of positive shock ,reflecting expansionary monetary policy, than in case of negative shock, when 
tight monetary policy is applied.  
Given these results and considering cases where the null hypothesis has been rejected (three out of six), it 
appears that in Rwanda, the deposit rates exhibit upward rigidity, φ1 ˃ φ2, implying that banks will tend to adjust 
their deposit rates downward at a faster rate than adjusting them upward.  This finding is consistent with the 
collusive pricing behavior of banks and valid in concentrated market, where banks are in a better position to avoid 
increase on deposit rates to minimize the cost of their funds (Hannan and Berger, 1991; Scholnick, 1996).Similar 
results have been found by Samba and Yan (2010) in member countries of the Central African Economic and 
Monetary Community and Aziakpono and Wilson (2010) in South Africa. The presence of asymmetry in the 
adjustment process of bank rates may also be attributable to inefficiencies in the banking sector (Fuertes, Heffernan 
and Kalotchou, 2006).  
ii). Lending rates 
Long-run and short run relationship 
Empirical estimations showed that lending rates were cointegrated with neither of the policy rates; hence the short 
and long-run pass-through of the policy rate to lending rates has been estimated by means of the transformed 
autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) model as proposed by Keele and De Boef (2004) on the basis of equations 
(12) and (13). Fifteen regressions have been run linking each category of lending rate (short, medium and long 
term) to policy rates. A significant long-run relationship has been identified only between the long term lending 
rate and the Repo rate and an asymmetric error-correction model has also been estimated, while the other 
regressions yielded no significant relationships between the variables. The estimated long-run pass-through of the 
Repo rate to long-term lending rate is as follows: 
Long term lending rate = 5.16 + 0.228 Repo rate                                                                              (19) 
As mentioned above, only in one case, a significant long-run and short run pass-through has been detected 
between the long term lending rate and the Repo rate. The long-run pass-through estimated on the basis of equation 
(12) is 0.228 in equation (19), while the short run or immediate pass-through calculated following the error-
correction model in equation (13) is 0.315, meaning that only 22.8 %  and 31.5 % of the innovation in the Repo 
rate are transmitted to the long term lending rate in the long and short run respectively. The estimated speed of 
adjustment in the short run error-correction model is -0.18.The null hypothesis in the asymmetric error correction 
model has not been rejected; there was indeed no negative error correction term, implying that there is no evidence 
of asymmetric adjustment in the lending rate since the adjustment process adjusts only to positive deviations from 
long-run equilibrium value; this result is similar to the finding by Bangura (2011) in the case of Ghana.  
Overall, it emerges from the above results that the interest rate pass-through from policy rates to lending rate 
is incomplete in the short run as well as in the long-run. These results support those found in Kigabo, Mwenese 
and Bagabe (2016) where the long-run pass-through between the lending and Treasury bill rates was 0.097, while 
the short run pass-through was estimated at 0.19. 
The lack of a cointegration relationship and the weak interest rate pass-through between the policy rates and 
lending rates confirm the absence of co-movement observed in the developments of the lending and policy rates 
depicted in Figures 1 and 2. It also suggests that lending rates may be determined by other factors than policy rates.  
In a recent policy document published by the National Bank of Rwanda, it was recognized that the “weak 
responsiveness of the lending rates to the change in the key repo rate is due to, among other factors, high operating 
costs in the banking sector and high provisions for bad loans despite declining in NPL ratio. In addition, behavior 
of borrowers such as lack of information on loan conditions and culture of not bargaining with banks has 
contributed to the rigidities in lending rates charged by banks” (NBR,  February 2015).  
Kigabo and Barebereho (2008) also concluded that in Rwanda, the volume of non-performing loans and risk 
aversion, the operating costs and macroeconomic variables (inflation), are among the main determinants of high 
lending rates and interest rate spread. Similar conclusion was drawn by Kiptui (2014) in his analysis pointing to 
macroeconomic variables (inflation, GDP growth rate and exchange rate variability) as the main factors 
influencing the fluctuations of the lending rate and the interest rate spread in Kenya.  
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VI. Conclusion and policy implications  
The objective of this study was to empirically examine the size and the speed of the interest rate pass-through in 
Rwanda and determine whether the interest rate adjustment dynamics is symmetric or asymmetric.  
Drawing on a standard analytical framework and empirical strategies, this research investigated the interest 
rate pass-through and the adjustment dynamics between the bank retail rates (deposit and lending rates) and the 
policy rates (Treasury bill and Repo rates). The study used monthly time series covering the period from 2008-1 
to 2016-12. Autoregressive distributed lag model, cointegration approach, linear and non-linear error correction 
models have been employed for empirical analysis.  
The results of the study may be summarized as follows. Consistent with most of earlier works for Rwanda 
and Africa, the estimated long-run and short run pass-through coefficients between the bank retail rates and the 
policy rates in this study show clearly that the interest rate pass-through is incomplete in Rwanda, highlighting the 
weakness of the interest rate channel. This suggests an inefficient monetary transmission mechanism in the 
financial market and poses a serious challenge to the Central bank. On average the pass-through is higher for 
deposit rates than for lending rates .The incomplete interest rate pass-through between the bank rates in Rwanda 
may be the result of underdeveloped financial system, relative degree of concentration, low level of competition , 
structural excess liquidity in the banking sector and high operating costs. However, the pass-through of the Repo 
rate to the interbank rate was found substantially higher and would then positively affect the transmission 
mechanism; this finding is crucial since the degree of the response of the interbank rate to changes in the policy 
rate is the first step of the whole pass-through process. 
Concerning the adjustment process of the bank retail rates, this study provided evidence of asymmetric 
adjustment of deposit rates to changes in policy rates; however this evidence was not supported for the case of 
lending rates. The results of the study showed in particular that deposit rates exhibit upward stickiness, meaning 
that banks adjust their deposit rates downward faster following cuts in policy rates, while they are reluctant in 
revising them upward following an increase in the policy rates. These results are consistent with those found in 
other studies and lend support to the collusive behavior of banks in the deposit market.  
The policy implications of the empirical results of this study are that the effectiveness of the monetary policy 
transmission to the economy through the interest rate channel may be limited. The weak interest rate pass-through 
identified in Rwanda implies that to be effective in the current monetary policy framework, cuts or increases of 
policy rates should be stronger. In this context, being aware of the asymmetric adjustment of the bank retail rates 
would provide additional information to monetary authorities in the determination of the appropriate timing and 
instrument before taking policy action. With regard to monetary instruments, the findings of this study suggest 
that the Repo rate would be the most effective instrument to use given its higher impact on interbank, deposit and 
lending rates. Hence the role and the share of the repo transactions should be enhanced in the open market 
operations.  
Overall, the findings of this study suggest that to enhance the effectiveness of the monetary policy, the 
monetary authorities should focus on addressing factors that weaken the transmission of the policy rate changes to 
bank retail rates. To this effect, reforms in the financial system in Rwanda should be pursued by supporting the 
development of new financial products and non-bank financial institutions to reduce concentration and increase 
competition in the financial market. In addition, the monetary authorities should promote and implement policies 
that will further spur the development of security market to provide alternative sources of saving and funding to 
firms and individuals mainly relying so far on bank loans and deposits; the efforts currently made to strengthen 
the capital market through issuance of Government T-Bonds are a step in the right direction. Finally, to enhance 
the interest rate pass-through and consequently the monetary transmission mechanism, regular communication 
between the National Bank of Rwanda with banks should further focus on strategies to reduce information 
asymmetry in the deposit and loan markets, promote efficiency of the banking sector in liquidity management and 
reducing operating costs, improve the quality of loans through stronger regulation.   
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